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SUING UNCLE SAM IN TORT
A Review of the Federal Tort Claims Act and Reported Decisions
to Date.*
HERBmT R. BA_**.
Although the founding of the United States was the result of a firm
conviction on the part of the fathers of this country that the King, not
only could, but had done wrong, the concept of sovereign immunity was
adopted as a- part of our philosophy of government.' The individual
who was the victim of a tort or a breach of contract on the part of the
United States was without a remedy as a matter of right. Such an
aggrieved person, prior to 1855, had only one hope of recompense. He
might, if he were fortunate and knew the right people, succeed in hav-
ing a private bill introduced in Congress which bill if enacted would
provide for payment to him of such amount as Congress saw fit to
award under the circumstances. All' compensation was a matter of
grace coupled with political good fortune.
As was to be expected, the preparation, introduction and passage of
private bills placed an undue burden"a on Congress which should more
appropriately concern itself with public affairs. The first step taken to
alleviate this situation was the establishment of the Court of Claims in
1855.2 As originally created, it was not really a court but merely an
advisory body which heard claims of a limited sort and then prepared
such bill awarding compensation as appeared to it just. The bill would
then be turned over to Congress which body might, or might not, enact
the same into law. The said Court was required to hear claims founded
on any law of Congress or regulation of an executive department, or
* December 1, 1947.
** Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
United States v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436 (U. S. 1834); The Siren, 7 Wall. 152(U. S. 1868) ; Eastern Transport Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 675, 472 (1927).
xi, In this connection the discussion in the House of Representatives on a Fed-
eral Torts Claim Act in 1940 which failed to become law is of interest. Speaking
in support of the then bill, H. R. 7236, Mr. Celler said, "The average number of
private claims brought into the House during the last two Congresses- has been
about 2,300 per Congress and involve over $100,000,000 each Congress. In the
Seventieth Congress, for example, in the House of Representatives 1,364 claim
bills were presented; in the Senate, 904; all involving $106,685,748.67. Three
hundred and thirty-six of these bills were enacted, 230 House bills and 106 Senate
bills." Mr. Luce also speaking in support of the then bill said, "If we make no
further progress, then, sir, we accept continuance of a burden that is serious, we
accept a procedure that is outrageous, we accept a result that does no credit either
to Congress or to the Nation." 86 Cong. Rec. 12018 (1940). On July 25, 1946,
during the discussion of the present Federal Tort Claims Act, Mr. Celler an-
nounced that "Over 2,000 claim bills were filed in this very session of Congress."
92 Cong. Rec. 10067 (1946).2 10 STAT. 612 (1855).
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upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the
United States. It had no jurisdiction over tort claims.
In 1863 the power of the Court of Claims was enlarged to the extent
that instead of. preparing bills for Congress it.could now render a final
judgment.3 -This judgment, however, was subject to an estimate by the
Secretary of the Treasury of the amount required to pay each claimant.
The Supreme Court 4 held that the estimate provision was inconsistent
with the finality essential to judicial decisions and thereupon Congress
repealed that provision in 1866.5 Thus by 1866 the United States had
discarded the. shield.-of sovereign immunity in a limited field. The
Supreme Court cautiously approached the doctrine of non-immunity
and zealously protected such sovereign immunity which still remained.
And there remained much, for the entire field of tort claims was still
untouched. The language of Mr. Justice Miller written in 1868 is
illustrative of the attitude of the then Supreme Court. Speaking of the
Court of Claims, he said:
"The creation by Act of Congress of a court in which the United
States may be sued, presents a novel feature in our jurisprudence,
though the act limits such suits to claims founded on contracts, ex-
press or implied, with certain unimportant exceptions. But in the
exercise of this unaccustomed jurisdiction, the courts are embar-
rassed by the necessary absence of precedent and settled principles
by which the liability of the government may be determined ..
The language of the statutes excludes by the strongest implication
demands against the government founded on torts. The general
principle which we have already stated as applicable to all govern-
ments, forbids, on a policy imposed by necessity, that they should
hold themselves liable for unauthorized wrongs inflicted by their
officers on the citizen, though occurring while engaged in the dis-
charge of official duties.""
The policy which Mr. Justice Miller found was "imposed by neces-
sity" and which prevented an action in tort against a sovereign state
was made the subject of minor exceptions by various Acts of Congress
from time to time.7 But it was not until August 2, 1946 that the policy
'12 STAT. 765 (1863).
'Gordon V. United States, 2 Wall. 561 (U. S. 1864). See the appendix in
117 U. S. 697 for the full report of this case.
114 STAT. 9 (1866). This statute not only eliminated the objectionable estimate
provision but also expressly authorized appeals to the Supreme Court.
6 Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269, 274 (U. S. 1868), italics added.
"12 STAT. 820 (1863) authorized owners of property seized by Union troops
to sue ir1 the Court of Claims under certain conditions; 26 STAT. 851 (1891) Court
of Claims given power to entertain suits in behalf of those property owners whose
property had been destroyed by Indians in amity with the United States; 36 STAT.
851 (1910) patent infringement suits against the government; 41 STAT. 525 (1920)
admiralty suits against the United States extended to include public vessels by 43
STAT. 1112 (1925) ; 49 STAT. 1028, 1049 (1935) suits for damages to oyster beds
as the result of Harbor Improvements. In the creation of so-called "government
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of governmental non-liability for tort was really doomed when on that
date Congress enacted the FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT." This statute,
more than any other since the establishment of the Court of Claims in
1855, has torn away the cloak of sovereign immunity from the United
States. Today, not only may the government be sued in Contract but
it may also be sued in Tort.'0
Inasmuch as a large percentage of every trial attorney's work is made
up of negligence cases it reasonably follows that the average trial attorney
is very apt, sooner or later, to be confronted with a negligence case
against the United States government. The use by the government of
automobiles in the transportation of mail and in other governmental
activities is alone bound to result in a substantial number of accidents
from which litigation will spring. It is the purpose of this article to
both review the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act and to give
a blanket coverage of all cases reported to date' construing the Act.' 2
Two METHODS OF HANDLING TORT CLAIMS
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides for two methods of handling
an individual's tort claim against the government, (1) by administra-
tive adjustment where the claim is $1,000 or less, and (2) by suit irre-
spective of the amount of the claim. We will first consider the
administrative adjustment provisions found in Section 40313 of the Act.
ADMINISTRATIvE ADJUSTMENT OF TORT CLAIMS
Section 403(a) confers authority on the head of each Federal
Agency, or his designee for the purpose, subject to certain limitations
set forth in subsequent sections, to settle any money claim against the
United States accruing on and after January 1, 1945 for property dam-
corporations" as the Federal Home Loan Bank 47 STAT. 725 (1932); Home
Owners' Loan Corporation 48 STAT. 128 (1933); Tennessee Valley Authority 48
STAT. 58 (1933) and others Congress has subjected said corporations to suit and
removed the immunity inherent in the government itself. See for a discussion of
this Congressional action and an enumeration of the government corporations that
were declared subject to suit Keifer v. Keifer, 306 U. S. 381, 390; note, 59 Sup.
Ct. 516 (1938).
8 60 STAT. 842, 28 U. S. C. A. §921 et seq. (Supp. 1946).
'By virtue of the Tucker Act, 24 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U. S. C. A. §41 (20)
(1927), the District Courts were given concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Claims in all Contract actions against the United States where the demand did not
exceed $10,000. If the claimant sought to recover more than $10,000 his proper
remedy was in the Court of Claims.
"0 Not all types of torts are made the subject of suit by the Federal Tort
Claims Act. Section 421 of the Act which is stated in full later in the body of
this article enumerates certain torts which are expressly excluded from the coverage
of the statute. See p. 135 infra.
" The manuscript of this article was completed December 1, 1947.
12 No attempt is made herein to review the legislative history of the Act. This
has been the 'subject of treatment elsewhere. See Comment, The Federal Tort
Claims Act, 56 YALE L. J. 534 (1947) and Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-
A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEo. L. J. 1 (1946).1260 STAT. 842, 843, 28 U. S. C. A. §921 (Supp. 1946).
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age, personal injury or- death, where the total claim does not exceed
$1,000 and the damage or injury was caused by the negligent or wrong-
ful act or omission of any employee' 4 of the United States government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States if a private person would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.
Aside from the specific limitations contained in other sections of the
Act, the scope of the administrative adjustment section will depend on
the construction to be placed on certain of the words and phrases used
in. that section. The authority to adjust is conferred on the head of
each "Federal Agency." The term "Federal Agency"1 5 is one that calls
for definition and Congress undertook to specifically define that term in
Section 402(a) of the Act as follows:
"'Federal Agency' includes the executive departments and inde-
pendent establishments of the United States, and corporations
whose primary function is to act as, and while acting as, instru-
mentalities or agencies of the United States, whether or not author-
ized to sue and be sued in their own names: Provided, That this
shall not be construed to include any contractor with the United
States."
The above definition, itself, contains terms which may well lead to
controversy. Thus the phrase "corporations whose primary function is
to act as, and while acting as, instrumentalities or agencies of the United
States" will lead to the inquiries, (1) what was the primary function of
the corporation in question, and (2) if its primary function was to act as
an instrumentality or agency of the United States was it so acting at the
time of the wrong alleged? It is important to note the use of the con-
junctive "and." The corporation in question must not only have as its
primary function acting as an instrumentality or agency of the United
States but it must also be acting as such instrumentality or agency when
the tort is committed. Consequently, before the practitioner invokes the
Federal Tort Claims Act when a colloquially called "government cor-
poration" is involved he must fully satisfy himself as to the two afore-
stated requirements.
Another phrase found in the administrative adjustment section,
24 Section 402(b) of the Federal Tort Claims Act defines employee as follows:
"'Employee of the Government' includes officers or employees of any Federal
Agency, members of the military or naval forces of the United States, and per-
sons acting on behalf of a Federal Agency in an official capacity, temporarily or
permanently- in the service of the United States, whether with or without com-
pensation."
"
5 The Library of Congress was held to be a Federal Agency within the mean-
ing of the Federal Tort Claims Act in Decision No. B-65754 rendered by the
Comptroller General on May 22, 1947. See note on this decision in 33 A. B. A. J.
937 (1947).
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403 (a), is "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee." With the word "negligent" there should be no difficulty of
interpretation, but the words "wrongful act or omission" do present a
problem of interpretation .not answered by any definition in the Act.
What is meant by the word "wrongful"? Does the word cover situations
where as between individuals liability is imposed without fault? Take
the familiar doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher'6 under which the owner of a
reservoir was held liable to neighboring property owners damaged by
escaping waters even though the escape and ultimate damage were with-
out any negligent or intentional act or omission of the owner. Or con-
sider the blasting-cases where in certain jurisdictions a person blasting
is held absolutely liable for damage done even though he has not been
guilty of negligence.' 7  Let us suppose that the United States should
have in its possession wild animals, ferae naturae,18 and that without
fault of the government one of those animals escapes and injures an indi-
vidual. In all of these cases many jurisdictions would impose liability
on the private person as owner regardless of fault. Is the United States
in such cases to be held liable as would a private individual or is the
injury complained of not the result of a "wrongful act or omission"
within the meaning of the Federal Tort Claims Act?
In that connection we may look forward to litigation in which it is
sought to hold the United States liable for injuries to persons and dam-
ages to property by reason of the operation of its aeroplanes.' 9 Several
states have enacted the Uniform Aeronautics Act20 which imposes abso-
lute liability upon the owner of aircraft for damages occasioned by the
flight or descent of aircraft or the dropping of articles therefrom irre-
spective of whether or not the owner has been negligent. Does the fact
that the state statute or state decisional law gives the injured party a legal
cause of action against a private person engaged in such activities mean
10 L. R. 3 H. L. 330, 37 L. J. Ex. 161, 19 L: T. 220 (1868). For a discussion
of this famous case see PROSSER, TORTS, pp. 449-456 (1941) ; Bbhlen, The Rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. PA. L. REv. 298 (1911). While the case has been
accepted as law in England the doctrine of absolute liability without fault enun-
ciated therein has been both accepted and rejected by state courts in this country.
Cases will be found collected.in PROSSER, TORTS, supra.17 Adams v. Sengel, 177 Ky. 535, 197 S. W. 974 (1917); Louisville & N. R.
Co. v. Smith, 203 Ky. 513, 263 S. W. 29 (1924) ; Hay v. Cohoes, 2 N. Y. 159, 51
Am. Dec. 279 (1849). See Note, 35. A. L. R. 1238, 1244 (1924). See also as
imposing absolute liability RESTATEMENT, TORTS §519 (1934).
For the law relating to the liability of an owner of a wild or dangerous
animal see HARPER, TORTS §171 (1941); PROSSER, TORTS- §57 (1941); Buckle v.
Homes,'2 K. B. 125, 42 T. L. R. 147 (1926) and the excellent collection of cases
giving the conflicting views in 69 A. L. R. 500-517 (1930).
1" In fact such litigation has already arisen. See Commissioners of the State
Ins. Fund v. United States and Scannell and Oliver v. United States, 72.F. Supp.
549 (S. D. N. Y. July 21, 1947) discissed infra p. 133 and Skeels v. United States,
72 F. Supp. 372 (W. D. La. July 7, 1947) stated at p. 136 infra.
'" 11 UN ioR LAws ANN. 159 (1938). The Act has been adopted in twenty-
one states including North Carolina. N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§63-10 to 63-23.
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that there has been such a legal wrong as is within the scope of the
"wrongful act or omission" language of the Federal Tort Claims Act?
If it was the intention of Congress to give the injured person a remedy
against the government when he would have a remedy against a private
person it may well be argued that recovery should be allowed under the
Act especially since such cases are not specifically mentioned in Section
421 which excepts certain torts and will be discussed later herein.
21 If
this class of bases is not covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act the
remedy by private bill still remains.
22
The negligent or wrongful act or omission of the employee of the
government must have occurred while the employee was "acting within
the scope of his office or employment." This phrase is of course subject
to interpretation according to the ordinary principles of agency law.
However, Section 402(c) specifically defines the phrase in so far as it is
applicable to military or naval forces as follows:
"'Acting within the scope of his office or employment,' in the case
of a member of the military or naval forces of the United States,
means acting in line of duty."
The phrase "in line of duty"' 3 in the military sense is subject to
broader interpretation than "scope of employment" as generally con-
strued and was apparently inserted for the purpose of including acts
which while "in line of duty" in the military sense may not be said to
have been within the common law interpretation of "scope of employ-
ment."
239
Finality of Award or Settlement.
By Section 403(b) all awards or determinations made under the
Administrative Adjustment provision are made final and conclusive on
all officers of the Government unless obtained by fraud. Similarly Sec-
21 See infra p. 135.
"
2Section 131 of the LwaisLATnvE REORC.ANIZAATION Acr of 1946, 60 STAT. 812
at 831 expressly forbids the introduction of private bills in cases covered by the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Cases not within the scope of the Act are still the
proper subject of a private bill.
2' For an excellent paper which discusses in detail the difficulties involved in
construing the phrase "in line of duty" see the opinion of Attorney General A.
Mitchell Palmer, 32 Ops. Arr'y. GEN. 12 (1919). A more recent treatment of the
subject is found in Doke v. United States, 131 P. 2d (Wash.) 436 (1942),
affirmed o) rehearing, 135 P. 2d 71 (1943).
" After the manuscript of this article had been placed in the printer's hands
the case of Rutherford v. United States 73 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Tenn. N.D. June
19, 1947) was reported. A naval recruiting officer had given a radio broadcast
in the performance of his duties. While driving home from the broadcasting
station in his private car he met with an accident as a result of which the plain-
tiff was injured. judge Taylor held that at the time of the accident the recruiting
officer was not "acting in line of duty" and hence was not "acting within the scope
of his office or employment" within the meaning of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
[Voi.26
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tion 403 (c) provides that the acceptance of any settlement, award- or
compromise by a claimant shall be final and conclusive on him and shall
constitute a complete release not only as to the United States but also
as to the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim. This
latter provision is in accord with the wel settled common law rule that
a release of a principle for a tort committed by his agent operates as a
release of the agent as well.
2 4
Appropriations and Reports.
All payments of awards are to be made by the head of the Federal
Agency in question out of appropriations for that purpose which are
expressly authorized by Section 403(c). The head of each Federal
Agency is required by Section 404 to make an annual report to Con-
gress of all claims settled in which he shall state the name of the claim-
ant, the amount of the settlement and the nature of the claim.
SUITS ON TORT CLAIms AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
It is by Section 410(a) of the Act that the government surrenders
its sovereign immunity and authorizes action in tort against it. Ex-
clusive jurisdiction is conferred upon the federal district court where
the plaintiff is a resident or where the act of omission occurred, sitting
without a jury, to hear and determine and render judgment on any
claim against the United States for money only, which accrued on or
after January 1, 1945 by reason of property damage, personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-
ployee of the United States government while acting within the scope
of his. office or employment under circumstances where the United
States if a private person would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. The
section authorizes the recovery of costs but provides that attorney's
fees shall not be included in costs and that the United States shall not
be liable for interest prior to judgment nor for punitive damages.
Jurihdictional Amount.
It is to be noted that there is no jurisdictional limit and as the Act
now stands the plaintiff may sue for any amount he wishes. His claim
need not exceed $3,000 as it must in diversity cases and it may exceed
the $10,000 limit set for contract suits under the Tucker Act.2 5
Venue.
The venue provision contained in this section of the statute should
be carefully observed. The suit must be either in the district where the
-' Serr v. Biwabik Concrete Aggregate Co., 202 Minn. 165,-278 N. .W. 355,
1009 (1938) ; Losito v. Kruse, 136 Ohio St. 183, 24 N. E. 2d 705 (1940) annotated
in detail 126 A. L. R. 1199.
" See note 9 supra.
19481
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plaintiff resides or where the act or omission complained of occurred..
There conceivably will be cases where the act or omission occurred in
District A, the injury in District B and the residence of the plaintiff
was in District C. Under such a set of facts District C would always
be proper for venue purposes whereas there may be a question raised
as to whether the district where the injury was sustained was in fact
the district where the act or omission took place. Safe practice would
indicate the action be laid in District C, the residence of the plaintiff.
No Jury Trial.
Since the trial is to be without a jury it is quite apparent that some
difficulty in administration will be caused where the United States is
alleged to be a joint tort-feasor with a third party. Whether in such
a case there may be joinder of the parties will be discussed later herein2
Judgment as a Bar to Further Action.
Section 410(b) provides that the judgment recovered against the
United States shall be a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by
reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the govern-
ment whose act or omission gave rise to the claim. Such a provision
is, of course, in accord with the common law rule that a claimant can
have but one satisfaction for one wrong.2 7 Presumably the claimant
will have been made whole by virtue of the judgment he obtained against
the government and hence should have no claim against the employee.
An interesting situation may be envisaged, however, which eventually
will require solution. Let us suppose that the claimant has recovered
against the United States for injuries suffered as a result of the negli-
gent operation of an automobile by an employee of the United States.
Let us then suppose further that the claimant institutes an action against
the employee in which he sets up the same injury, the same accident,
but alleges that the employee was driving in a grossly negligent manner
and wilfully and maliciously ran into the claimant wherefore the claim-
ant seeks to recover both actual and punitive damages.28 His claim for
actual damages will be barred having been already satisfied in his action
against the government. What will happen to his claim for punitive
damages? It will be recalled that the government is not to be liable for
punitive damages.2 9 If the claimant chooses to sue the government on
'8 See infra p. 129.
'
7 Holland v. Utilities Co., 208 N. C. 289, 180 S. E. 592 (1935).
2 In Horton v. Coach Co., 216 N. C. 567, 5 S. E. 2d 828 (1939) the court
said, "If the tort is the result of simple negligence, damages will be restricted to
such as are compensatory, but if it was willful, or committed with such circum-
stances as to show gross negligence, punitive damages may be given." (Italics our
o.wn.) See also in this connection Jackson v. Scheiber, 209 N. C. 441, 184 S. E.
17 (1936) where the defendant master was held not liable to the plaintiff who
alleged that the servant had intentionally driven fhe master's car into him.
2 Sec. 410(a), 60 STAT. 842, 844, ."... the United States shall not be liable
for.., punitive damages."
(Vol. 26
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a theory of simple negligence will he thereby be barred from suing the
employee on a theory of such gross negligence and recklessness as to
warrant the finding of malice upon which punitive damages are predi-
cated? This question, along with othersi will have to await judicial
decision for its answer.
Suit Folloiuing an Attempted Administrative Adjustment.
In the event the claimant has presented a claim to the Federal Agency
alleged to be responsible under Section 403 of the Act he may not
institute suit against the government under Section 410 unless either,
(1) the Federal Agency has made a final disposition of the claim, or
(2) the claimant shall have given 15 days notice in writing to the Fed-
eral Agency that he is withdrawing his claim.30 If the claimant should
decide to sue after his claim has been presented, rejected, or withdrawn,
he cannot sue for more than the amount of the claim he presented to
the Federal Agency unless the increased amount sought is based upon
"newly discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of
presentation of the claim to the Federal Agency or upon evidence of
intervening facts relating to the amount of the claim."'
Any disposition of a claim made by the Federal Agency under
Section 403 may not be used as evidence of liability or the amount of
damages in the event suit is brought under Section 410.32
Procedure.
Section 411 provides that a1 writs, pleadings, motions and practice
and procedure shall be in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and that the provisions of the Tucker Act shall apply to
counterclaims, set-offs and the payment of the judgment and interest
thereon.m Although the procedure is to be in line with the Federal
Rules the substantive law to be applied is that of the place where the
negligent or wrongful act took place.3 4
This last mentioned provision relating to the substantive law appli-
cable was before the court in Spell v. United States.3 5 The plaintiff's
decedent had been killed by reason of the negligence of the driver of a
Navy bus operated by the United States in Florida. The defence given
in behalf of the government was that the bus driver had been blinded
by the headlights of an approaching automobile. Under the decisional
" Sec. 410(b), 60 STAT. 842, 844, 28 U. S. C. A. §§921, 931 (Supp. 1946).
31Ibid.
52 Ibid.
" Section 10 of the Tucker Act, 24 STAT. 505, 507 (1887), 28 U. S. C. A.
§765 (1928) provides that final judgments shall carry interest at the rate of 4 per
cent per annum.
"' Sec. 410(a), 60 STAT. 842, 844 states that liability shall be, "in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
' 72 F. Supp. 731 (S. D. Fla. July 23, 1947).
1948]
128 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol.26
law of Florida a motorist who is blinded by the lights of an approaching
vehicle is under a duty to stop his car until he can once again see ahead
and his failure to do so is negligence.36 Judge De Vane, speaking for
the United States District Court, held that by virtue of the provisions
of the Federal Tort Claims Act the District Court was bound to follow
the law of Florida where the negligence had been committed..
The problem in the Spell case was relatively simple. But, because
the "line between procedural and substantive law is hazy"3 7 and the
courts have not been uniform in their decisions as to just what con-
stitutes substance and what is procedure it is quite evident that some
difficulties will be encountered. For example: suppose the tort was
committed in state B and the federal court in which the action is brought
happens to be sitting in state A, the plaintiff's residence. Suppose that
in state A the plaintiff must prove himself free from contributory negli-
gence on his own case while in state B the burden of proving con-
tributory negligence is on the defendant. Suppose further that the state
court in state A has construed its rule as one of substance and that in
state B the rule is declared to be one of procedure only. Can the plain-
tiff prevail in state A without proving himself free from negligence?
Again, invert the positions of the states and assume that state B requires
the plaintiff to prove himself free from contributory negligence and holds
that such a provision is a matter of substance. State A holds that the
burden of proving contributory negligence is on the defendant and is a
matter of procedure. Can the plaintiff prevail in the federal court in
state A without proving himself free from negligence on his own case?3s
In diversity of citizenship cases the Supreme Court has held that a
federal court sitting in state A must apply the law of that state as to
the burden of proof,3 9 the conflict of laws40 and contributory negli-
gence.41 It has been suggested that the rule applied in diversity cases
has no application to suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act but that
in suits under that statute the federal courts should adopt a general rule
and determine according to their own views whether a particular matter
is one of substance or procedure. By so doing, it is claimed, all federal
"' Mathers v. Botsford, 86 Fla. 40, 97 So. 382 (1923).
" Mr. Justice Reed dissenting in, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64,
92 (1938). See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's remarks on "substance and procedure"
in Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 108 (1945).
"See in this connection Central-Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 511 (1915)
where Mr. Justice Lamar said, "But matters of substance and procedure must not
be confounded because they happen to have the same name ... it is a misnomer
to say that the question as to the burden of proof as to contributory negligence
is a mere matter of state procedure. For, in Vermont, and in a few other states,
proof of plaintiff's freedom from fault is part of the very substance of his case."
See also GOODRICH, CoNLICr OF LAws 199 (1938).
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208 (1939).
,Klaxon v. Stentor, 313 U. S. 487 (1941).
"'Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109, 719 (1943).
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courts, wherever they may sit, would be governed by the same rules in
determining whether the burden of proof or the question of contributory
negligence shall be considered as 'a matter of substance and hence con-
trolled by the law of the place where the act or omission occurred or as
a matter of procedure and therefore controlled by federal law.4
Take another instance. Is res ipsa loquitur a rule of substantive
or procedural law? Shall the federal court sitting in state A apply the
rule of res ipsa loquitur of the state courts in state A or shall it apply
the rule of res ipsa loquitur as interpreted by the courts of state B where
the negligent act or omission took place? In a recent diversity of citizen-
ship case the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit had.
occdsion to consider this question in detail and came to the conclusion
that res ipsa loquitur was a- rule of substantive law.48 Accordingly, in
an action pending in a federal court sitting in Virginia and which arose
out of an accident occurring in Maryland the court held that the law of.
Maryland controlled as to the effect of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Joinder of Parties Defen.dant.
To date three reported cases 'have raised the problem of whether or
not-a plaintiff may join in the same action the United States Government
and a private individual charging them both with being joint tortfeasors.
The typical case is one in which two automobiles collide, one operated
by the United States and one by an individual and the plaintiff, as the
innocent third party, is injured.
As already stated, the Act provides that practice and procedure shall
be in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule
20(a) of those rules expressly authorizes the joinder of parties defend-
ant, ".. .. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if
there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative,
any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question
of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action."
The difficulty'with joining the United States and an individual in
the same action is that under the Federal Tort Claims Act the trial is
held by the Court without a jury whereas the individual has the right
'" Thomsen, "The Law of the Place" Provision. of the Act, 33 A. B. A. J. 959
(1947).
"'Lachman v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 160 F. 2d 496 (C. C. A. 4th
1947). Compare Harke v. Haase, 75 S. W. 2d (Mo.) 1001 (1934) in which res
ipsa loquitur is referred to as a rule of evidence. - See also the scholarly article
by Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MiuT. L. REv. 241
(1936) especially at p. 257 where he states, "In the first place, it should be clear
that what we are dealing with is nothing more than a matter of circumstantial
evidence."
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to a jury trial. For these reasons it has been contended that no joinder
is permissible under the Act.44  Court decisions to date have upheld
joinder notwithstanding the difficulties that might arise in the court
passing upon the case against the United States and the jury passing
upon the case in so far as it relates to the private individual.
In En.qlehardt v. United States4 5 the plaintiff, a citizen of Maryland,
was injured as the result of a collision betwen a motor Vehicle owned
and operated by the United States and a car being driven by the indi-
vidual defendant, Quillen, who was a citizen of Delaware. Quillen
moved for a dismissal on the theory that he could not be joined in the
action with the United States. Judge Chesnut denied the motion stat-
ing that he could find no evidence of any intent on the part of Congress
to prohibit the joinder of the actions. He declared that decisions under
the Tucker Act46 prohibiting joinder were inapplicable because the
jurisdiction of the District Courts under the Tucker Act was concurrent
with that of the Court of Claims and that the Court of Claims never
did have jurisdiction to entertain suits against private individuals. As
to the difficulty presented by the fact that the individual defendant is
entitled to a jury trial the court declared that, (1) as a matter of fact
the individual may never demand the jury trial, and (2) if he does
demand it there is nothing to prevent the case being tried at one and
the same time with -the judge giving the judgment in so far as the
United States is concerned and the jury rendering a verdict as to the
individual defendant. Indeed, if the court should prefer not to engage
in such a procedure it may always order separate trials as a matter of
convenience under Rule 42(b) .47
It is, of course, apparent that there may be conflicting decisions
made by the court and jury. Perhaps the astute trial judge, if he
determines to try the case against both defendants at one and the same
time, will await the jury's verdict before handing down his own judg-
ment as to the claim against the United States. Conceivably, if the
jury departs too far from the views7 of the trial judge he may find him-
self obliged to set the verdict aside as against the weight of the evidence.
"Comment, The Federal Tort Claim Act, 56 YALE L. J. 534, 555 (1947) ;
Contra, Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claim Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35
Gzo. L. J. 1, 36 (1946).
' 69 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. January 18, 1947).
46 The court referred to United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584 (1941) in
which the Supreme Court held that a suit could not be maintained under the
Tucker Act (supra, note 9) against the United States and another defendant
jointly.
'" The rule reads, "Separate Trials. The court in furtherance of convenience
or to avoid prejudice may orde" a separate trial of any claim, cross claim, counter-
claim, or third party claim, or any separate issue or of any number of claims,
cross claims, counterclaims, third party claims or issues."
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In Dickens v. Jackson and United States8 it appeared that the indi-
vidual defendant joined with the United States was a citizen of the
same state as the plaintiff. Motion was made by the United States to
have the case dismissed as against the individual because of lack of
diversity. Judge Byers granted the motion on that ground but ex-
pressly refused to pass upon the question of whether or not there could
be joinder had there been the proper diversity between the plaintiff and
the individual defendant.
However, in Bullock v. United States 9 the same situation was pres-
ent. There was no diversity as between the plaintiff and the private
individual who had been joined as a co-defendant with the United States.
In this case the Government moved for a dismissal on the ground that
it could not be joined with an individual defendant under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Judge Smith denied the motion to dismiss as to the
United States, held that there could be a joinder and cited the Engle-
hardt case as his authority but then concluded that, on his own motion,
he would be compelled to dismiss the case as to the individual defendant
because of the lack of diversity of citizenship between him and the
plaintiff.
That is the state of affairs at the date of this writing. It remains to
be seen if the Circuit Court of Appeals and ultimately the United
States Supreme Court will sustain the joinder of an individual defend-
ant with the United States in an action brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.
Limitation of Actions.
As has been previously stated the torts covered by the Federal Tort
Claims Act are only those which accrued on or after January 1, 1945.
That date marks the beginning of the general tort liability of the United
States. The statute not only fixed a starting date but also provided a
defnite time limit within which claims might be presented for adminis-
trative adjustment or made the subject matter of a suit. Section 420
of the Act provides that any claim cognizable under the Act shall be
forever barred unless the claim is presented in writing to the Federal
Agency out of whose activities the claim arose (where claimant does
not seek more than $1,000) or unless suit is brought against the United
States irrespective of the amount of the claim within 1 year after the
accrual of the claim or within 1 year after the enactment of the statute
(August 2, 1946) whichever is later.
Although the limitations provision of the statute would seem to be
very clear that section has already been the subject matter of construc-
,s71 F. Supp. 753 (E. D. N. Y. May 15, 1947).
"72 F. Supp. 445 (D. N.. J. May 9, 1947).
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tibn by several United States District Court judges. In State of Mary-
land, to! the Use of Burkhardt v. United States50 an action for wrongful
death was brought under the Federal Torts Claims Act. It appeared
that the deceased was killed September 2, 1945 as a result of the alleged
negligence of the operator of a United States army truck. The suit
against the government was instituted December 5, 1946. The Mary-
land Wrongful Death Statute on which the action was predicated pro-
vides that "every such action shall be commenced within 12 calendar
months after the death of the deceased person."51
A motion was made to dismiss the complaint which was granted by
judge Chesnut. The court stressed the language in the act which pro-
vides that the United States shall be liable to suit as would a private
individual. U~nder the facts of this case a private person could not
have been sued on December 5, 1946 which was more than 12 months
from the date of death. The provision in the Federal Tort Claims Act
allowing suit within 1 year after August 2, 1946, the date of enactment
of the statute, was held not to enlarge the time provided for a wrongful
death, action by state law. State law tolled the period during which
the action could be brought and that was, in this case, 12 months after
September 2, 1945. Actually, had the plaintiff been aware of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act his case would not have been lost for he did
have the period from August 2, 1946 the date of enactment to Septem-
ber 2, 1946 the date of the tolling of the 12-month period provided for
in the Maryland Wrongful Death Statute within which to bring his
action. Judge Chesnut pointed out that the 12-month period provided
for by the Maryland statute was not to be regarded as a "period of
limitation but as an essential feature of the cause of action itself.05 2
In Sweet v. United States53 the plaintiff brought an action against
the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act within one year
after August 2, 1946, the enactment date. While the opinion does not
state, it would appear that the tort had been committed some time after
January 1, 1945 but more than a year before the institution of suit.
It so happened that the state of California where this action was pend-
ing had a one year limitation for tort actions and that consequently
under the state law the action would be barred. A motion to dismiss
was made by the United States on the theory that since, at the time the
suit was instituted a private individual could successfully plead the statute
of limitations the government should not be suable. The motion was
denied. Judge Yankwich held that the limitation period fixed by Con-
gress rather than the limitation period fixed by state law controlled.
5 70 F. Supp. 982 (D. Md. March 31, 1947).
" MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws (Flack, 1939) art. 67, §3.
2 70 F. Supp. 982, 985 (D. Md. 1947).
" 71 F. Supp. 863 (S. D. Cal. N. D. May 28, 1947).
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Here, then, is one instance where an action could be successfully main-
tained against the go'ernment when it would have failed against a private
.individual.
The two cases just discussed are readily reconcilable and illustrate
the recognized distinction between a statute which limits the time within
which a common law action may be brought and a statute which creates
for a limited period a cause of -action unknown at common law.
The tragedy that occurred when a United States bomber crashed
into the Empire State Building in New York City has given rise to
actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act and incidentally raised an
interesting question of limitations of actions by reason Of the New
York Workmen's Compensation law. In Commissioners of the State
Insurance Fund v. United States and Scannell and Oliver v. United
States54 actions were brought to recover damages for the personal in-
juries sustained by the individual plaintiffs who had been employed in
the Empire State Building and were injured as a result of the crash.
The disaster occurred on July 28, 1945 which was prior to the passage
of the Federal Tort Claims Act but after the date set (January 1, 1945)
for the accrual of claims.
Both the individual plaintiffs had in due course filed claims for
Workmen's Compensation benefits under the New York statute. The
said statute at that time provided that if the injured employee wished
to institute an action against the third party tort-feasor he was obliged
to start his action within 6 months after the date of the compensation
award and in any event within 1 year after the cause of action accrued.
If the employee did not commence his third party suit within that time
the action passed to the Workmen's Compensation insurance carrier,
here the Commissioners of the State Insurance Fund. The theory of
the statute is that a failure to start suit within the prescribed time oper-
ates as an assignment of the claim to the insurance carrier who then
may bring suit and retain out of the recovery not only the amount
paid in compensation benefits but also one third of the excess, the re-
maining two thirds going to the injured employee.55
On January 29, 1947 and on March 13, 1947 the New York Work-
men's Compensation law was amended so as to permit an action by the
injured employee against a third party tort-feasor to be commenced
"not later than 9 months after the enactment of a law creating, estab-
lishing, or affording a new or additional remedy." 56 The purpose of
the amendment was to enable injured employees to take advantage of
the Federal Tort Claims Act. Within 9 months after August. 2, 1946
' 72 F. Supp. 549 (S. D. N. Y. July 21, 1947).
" Consolidated Laws of New York, c. 67, §29.
" Laws of 1947, State of New York, c. 9 and c. 144.
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the individual plaintiffs had instituted suit against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Commissioner of the State
Insurance Fund had done likewise. Each claimed to be the proper
party plaintiff, the Commissioner by virtue of an assignment by opera-
tion of law since the actions had not been brought by the individuals
within 1 year after July 28, 1945, the date of the accident, and the indi-
viduals on the theory that their right to sue the government only accrued
August 2, 1946 and that their actions were brought within 9 months
of that date.
The government, in order to protect itself, contended that in each
case the plaintiff was not the proper party to bring the action. Judge
Holtzoff ruled in favor of the individual claimants and against the
commissioner. He held that the individuals had had no cause of action
against the government on the date of the injury, July 28, 1945, but
only acquired an action on August 2, 1946 when the Act was passed.
Therefore, he found the time period for bringing suit by the individuals
against the government as a tort-feasor began to run only from the
latter date. The court declared the 1947 amendments to the New York
Workmen's Compensation law were retroactive in effect since it was the
purpose of those amendments to give time to the individuals injured by
reason of the crash of the bomber to sue the government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.
Limitation Period Following Attempt at Administrative Adjustment.
It is very likely that if a claim is presented to a Federal Agency for
adjustment under Section 403 of the Act there may be considerable
delay and ultimately no settlement reached. To take care of this situation
Section 420 provides that if a claim for not more than $1,000 has been
presented to the Federal Agency involved within the time specified, the
time for the institution of suit on that claim in the event of no settle-
ment is extended for 6 months from the date of mailing of a notice to
the claimant by such Federal Agency as to the final disposition of the
claim or" for 6 months from the date of the withdrawal of the claim
from the agency by the claimant if the period of limitations would expire
sooner.T
Compromise of Litigated Claims.
The attorney general is authorized to arbitrate, compromise or settle
any claim for which a suit is pending under the Federal Tort Claims
Act if the court wherein the action is pending approves.58
Appeals.
Appeals from final judgments of the district courts acting under
Section 410 of the Act may be taken to either the circuit court of
: Sec. 420, 60 STAT. 842, 845, 28 U. S. C. A. §942 (Supp. 1946).8 Sec. 413, 60 STAT. 842, 845, 28 U. S. C. A. §934 (Supp. 1946).
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appeals as in other district court appeals or to the court of claims.
Appeals to the court of claims, however, may only be taken if the
notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil
irocedure shall have affixed thereto the consent of the appellees that
the appeal be taken to that court. From both the circuit court of
appeals and the court of claims appellate review is had in the Supreme
Court pursuant to Sections 239 and 240 of the Judicial Code.59
Claims Excepted from the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Certain types of claims are expressly excluded from the coverage
of the Federal Tort Claims Act and as to such claims the individual
claimant can neither seek administrative adjustment nor bring suit under
the Act. The exceptions are set forth in Section 421 as follows:
"(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute
or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid,
or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
Federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter.60
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection or
any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchan-
dise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforce-
ment officer.
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by the Act of
March 9, 1920 (U. S. C. title 46, secs. 741-752, inclusive), or the
Act of March 3, 1925 (U. S. C. title 46, secs. 781-790, inclusive),
relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States.
" JUDICIAL CODE §§239, 240, 28 U. S. C. A. §§346 and 347.
'0 This section will exclude claims for damages to postal matter but will it bar
the person who is injured by the negligent operation of a mail truck? On that
point the discussion had on an identical exception in H. R. 7236 (1940) supra,
note la. is of interest:
"MR. EBERHARTER. (After quoting the exception) It seems to me that
this exemption might embrace a situation where a mail truck would cause
damage to some individual or to his property, because the negligent trans-
mission of the postal matter might occur while it was being transported by
a mail truck.
MR. CELLER. We did consider that point, but the members of the com-
mittee, upon the suggestion of representatives of the Post Office Depart-
ment and the Attorney General's Office, thought that we should go a little
slowly on the situation. For that reason that clause was inserted. It was
inserted primarily because of the insistent suggestion of the Post Office
Department. I do not believe that if somebody is run down by a mail truck,
for example, due to the negligence of the driver, that section would preclude
any action against the Government.
MR. EBERHARTEm. I am glad to have the gentleman's explanation of that,
because I do not see any reason for making that exception." 86 Cong. Rec.
12019 (1940).
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(e)Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee
of the Government in administering the provisions of the Trading
with the Enemy Act as amended.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establish-
ment of a quarantine by the United States.
(g) Any claim arising from injury to vessels, or to the cargo,
crew, or pasengers of vessels, while passing through the locks of
the Panama Canal or while in Canal Zone waters.
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the
Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system.
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the mili-
tary or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley
Authority."
While the enumerated exceptions may deprive an individual of the
right to sue the Uinited States for a claim falling within one of them it
must be born in mind that the claimant is not without a remedy. If
the Federal Tort Claims Act does not cover the case of the individual
claimant and if no other statute affords him relief he may still pursue
the old method of having a private bill introduced in Congress.0 '
. In Skeels v. United States62 the court had occasion to construe
exception (j) relating to claims arising out of the combatant activities
of the miiltary forces during time of war. On July 24, 1945 the plain-
tiff's decedent was in fishing boat 6 miles offshore from Freeport, Texas.
High overhead the United States Army was engaged in target practice
the target being towed by a plane and the marksmen being located in
other planes. A piece of pipe, 14 inches in length, fell from either one
of the planes or the target and hit and killed the plaintiff's decedent.
An action was brought in due time against the government. The plain-
tiff contended that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied and that the
death of the deceased was due to the negligence of the United States.
The government moved to dismiss the complaint on two theories, (1)
that whatever injury occurred resulted from combat activities of the
armed forces .during time of war, and (2) the plaintiff had failed to
show any negligence.
Judge.Dawkins refused to dismiss the complaint and held that prac-
" See note 22 supra.2 72 F. Supp. 372 (W. D. D. La. July 7, 1947).
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tice or training activities, even in time of war, were not "combatant
activities" within the meaning of the exception in the Federal Tort
Claims Act. He also held that in view of allegations in the complaint
to the effect that no notice or warning had been given to the public
and no area restricted because of the target practice he was not pre-
pared to say as a matter of law that the complaint failed to allege negli-
gence. Although he mentioned the res ipsa loquitur argument of the
plaintiff he did not discuss the merits of it.6s
Exclusiveness of Remedy and Repealer.
By Section 42364 it is provided that after the enactment of the
statute, August 2, 1946, the mere fact that a Federal Agency may sue
or be sued in its own name shall not be construed to authorize suits
against such agency for claims cognizable under the Federal Tort Claims
Act for the remedy provided by the Act, when it exists, is exclusive.
All provisions of law which authorize any Federal Agency to settle
claims cognizable under the Act are repealed by Section 424.05 Any
power existing in Federal Agencies to settle claims not covered by the
Federal Tort Claims Act is not disturbed but expressly reserved.
Attorneys' Fees.
The amount to be collected by attorneys for services rendered clients
under the Federal Tort Claims Act is specifically limited by Section
422.66 If a settlement is reached under the Administrative Adjustment
section, then the head of the Federal Agency involved may, as a part
of the settlement, determine and allow a reasonable counsel fee. This
fee may not exceed 10% of the settlement if the amount recovered is
$500 or more. It is to be paid out of the settlement award but not in
addition thereto.
If the matter has been litigated, then either the court as a part of
its judgment or the attorney general as a part of the settlement, should
the litigation be settled, may determine and allow a reasonable counsel
fee which shall not exceed 20% of the judgment or settlement if the
same is $500 or more.67 Said fee, as in the case of .an administrative
adjustment, shall be paid out of the judgment or settlement and not in
addition thereto.
63 For a full discussion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as it applies to
aeroplanes see Goldin, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Law, 18
So. CAIw. L. REv. 15 and 124 (1944).
"60 STAT. 842, 846, 228 U. S. C. A. §945 (Supp. 1946).
"60 STAT. 842, 846, 28 U. S. C. A. §946 (Supp. 1946).8660 STAT. 842, 846, 28-U. S. C. A. §944 (Supp. 1946).
"' Under this provision a 20 per cent fee was allowed in a death action wherein
the judgment was $15,000. See Spell v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 731 (S. D.
Fla. July 23, 1947).
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An attorney who demands or receives fees in excess of those allowed
by the Act is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not over
$2,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year or both.
CONCLUSION
We have in the foregoing paper reviewed the provisions of the
Federal Tort Claims Act together with the decisions reported to date"8
construing the statute. A year is far too short a time for the develop-
ment of a well rounded body of interpretative law on a statute such as
we have had under consideration. However, if this survey will prove
of some assistance to the practising attorney who finds himself with a
possible tort claim against the United States it will have served its
purpose.
" See note 11, supra.
